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IRISH JUDICIAL STUDIES JOURNAL

JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL ACT 2019: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES

Author:

Abstract: The Judicial Council is tasked with promoting and maintaining high standards of judicial conduct.
The Judicial Council Act 2019 identifies judicial impartiality as a principle of judicial conduct that Irish
judges are required to uphold and exemplify. Despite its ubiquity, judicial impartiality is perhaps underexplained and under-examined.
This article considers the nature and scope of judicial impartiality in contemporary Irish judging. It argues
that the Judicial Council ought to take a proactive, multi-faceted approach to promote and maintain judicial
impartiality, to address contemporary challenges that the Irish judiciary face including increasingly
sophisticated empirical research into judicial performance, the proliferation of judicial analytics tools, and more
probative and critical media and social media coverage of the Irish judiciary.

Introduction
Judicial impartiality is a core value that judicial systems the world over espouse, and that
judges are expected to adhere to. Despite its ubiquity as a principle of judicial conduct,
judicial impartiality is under-explained and under-examined. More often than not, it is only
meaningfully considered when an allegation of judicial bias or judicial misconduct is made
against a judge. However, a more substantive reflection on judicial impartiality is arguably
necessary, considering new challenges that judiciaries, including the Irish judiciary, now face.
These challenges include:
-

the growth of empirical academic research that reveals a multitude of extraneous,
non-legal factors that can affect judges’ behaviour, performance and decisionmaking;
the proliferation of sophisticated judicial analytics tools that lawyers rely on in their
practice to measure and predict judicial behaviour and outcomes; and,
more probative and critical media coverage and social media commentary on judges’
performance on and off the bench.

These challenges test judiciaries’ and individual judges’ efforts to perform and convey judicial
impartiality.
The formative years of the Judicial Council present an important opportunity for the Irish
judiciary to meaningfully engage in what it means to be an ‘impartial’ judge. In an age where
judging is becoming more scrutinised and more measurable than ever before, the Council
ought to take a more proactive and multi-faceted approach towards promoting and
maintaining judicial impartiality, to directly address these, and other challenges that the Irish
judiciary currently face or will face in the near future.
The Judicial Council Act 2019 (the ‘2019 Act’) mentions judicial impartiality twice. It
identifies judicial impartiality as a stated principle of judicial conduct, alongside
independence, integrity, propriety (including the appearance of propriety), competence and
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diligence and to ensure equality of treatment to all persons before the courts.1 S7(1)(b) of the
2019 Act, which details the functions of the Judicial Council provides:
The functions of the Council shall be to promote and maintain—
…
(b) high standards of conduct among judges, having regard to the principles
of judicial conduct requiring judges to uphold and exemplify judicial
independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety (including the appearance of
propriety), competence and diligence and to ensure equality of treatment to
all persons before the courts.
S43(2) sets out the functions of the Judicial Conduct Committee, a committee comprising
13 members to deal with matters of judicial conduct, as follows:
The function of the Judicial Conduct Committee shall be to promote and
maintain high standards of conduct among judges, having regard to the
principles of judicial conduct requiring judges to uphold and exemplify
judicial independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety (including the
appearance of propriety), competence and diligence and to ensure equality of
treatment to all persons before the courts.
Three key points arise from these sections: first, judges must uphold and exemplify judicial
impartiality (among other principles of judicial conduct), second, one of the Council’s core
functions is to promote and maintain high standards of judicial conduct, including the principle
of judicial impartiality and, third, a committee within the Council, the Judicial Conduct
Committee, is specifically designated to this function. The 2019 Act does not define judicial
impartiality, nor does it set out specifically how the Council or the Judicial Conduct
Committee ought to promote and maintain high standards of judicial conduct, including
judicial impartiality.
To briefly outline the work of the Judicial Conduct Committee to date, the Committee was
established on 30 June 2020. Three subcommittees were subsequently formed, each focused
on dealing with a distinct element of the judicial conduct regime: one dealing with drafting
guidelines on judicial conduct and ethics, one tasked with preparing procedures for
resolution of complaints by informal means, and one considering and drafting complaints
procedures. 2 The Committee submitted draft guidelines to the Council’s Board on 28 June
2021, and the 2019 Act requires that the Council must adopt those guidelines within a further
twelve-month period from that date. 3 It remains to be seen how the guidelines will address
judicial impartiality.
The principle that judges must be impartial is almost ubiquitous in judicial systems around
the globe, yet judicial impartiality is an amorphous concept that does not enjoy a precise
definition. Given it is a central tenet of what we expect from our judges, it is necessary to
investigate what judicial impartiality means, and what its scope is, in order to understand how
it applies in the 2019 Act, and how the Council can best promote and maintain it.

s 7(1)(b) of the 2019 Act.
Judicial Council, ‘Annual Report’ (Judicial Council 2020) 26.
3 Niall O’Connor, ‘Courts Service Cannot Investigate 41 Complaints against Judges Received in the Last
Three Years’ (thejournal.ie, 19 December 2021) <https://www.thejournal.ie/courts-service-judicialcomplaints-ireland-5632314-Dec2021/> accessed 13 January 2022.
1
2
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The remainder of this article is set out as follows: the next section briefly considers the
literature explaining and examining judicial impartiality from theoretical and practical
perspectives. The section after that outlines how three challenges that the Irish judiciary (and,
indeed, other judiciaries) face—probative empirical research on judicial behaviour and
decision-making, the proliferation of judicial analytics tools, and heightened media and social
media scrutiny of Irish judges and their work—may affect judicial impartiality, and
perceptions of it, in Ireland. The article concludes with some reflections on how the Judicial
Council might best approach its statutory function to promote and maintain high standards
of judicial conduct, with a particular emphasis on judges’ duty to uphold and exemplify
judicial impartiality.

What is Judicial Impartiality?
Judicial impartiality, as a principle of good judicial conduct, has long-standing prominence in
several ancient legal systems and foundational works of legal philosophy: the Babylonian
code of Hammurbai, 4 and Indian 5 and Mongolian 6 legal systems recognised it as a key value,
Socrates identified it as an essential quality of a judge, 7 and Biblical and Roman sources
referred to it. 8 It is accepted in key modern international legal instruments such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. 9
Despite its considerable pedigree as a core principle of judicial conduct espoused by judicial
systems the world over, judicial impartiality is ‘rarely subject to sustained theoretical
analysis,’ 10 and, to borrow a phrase, ‘more easily acclaimed than understood.’ 11 Judicial
scholar Charles Gardner Geyh wryly observed that judicial impartiality is ‘a feel-good term
like ‘puppies’ and ‘pie’ that no decent soul would denigrate.’12 Judith Resnik took a more
withering view: judicial impartiality has been reduced to a ‘buzz word’, 13 with current
requirements that ‘seem almost perfunctory – either not to be taken seriously or to be
understood as ritualistic incantations of a tradition, the content of which is obscure.’ 14

Joe McIntyre, The Judicial Function: Fundamental Principles of Contemporary Judging (Springer 2019) 17.
In ancient Indian courts, judges took an oath of the son of Vivasan, the oath of impartiality. The son of
Vivasvan is Yama, the god of death, considered to be impartial to all living beings. The Hon Justice SS
Dhavan, ‘The Indian Judicial System: A Historical Survey’ (Allahabad High Court) 3.
6 Paul Ratchnevsky, ‘Jurisdiction, Penal Code, and Cultural Confrontation under Mongol-Yüan Law’ (1993)
Asia Major 161, 162–163.
7 Bertha Wilson, ‘Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference’ (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 507,
508.
8 McIntyre (n 4) 17.
9 For an overview of the origins and evolution of judicial impartiality, see ‘Judicial Impartiality: Conceptions
of Judicial Impartiality in Theory and Practice’ (Australian Law Reform Commission 2021) Background Paper
JI4 4–6.
10 McIntyre (n 4) 161.
11 The Right Hon Sir Ninian M Stephens, ‘Judicial Independence - A Fragile Bastion’ in Shimon Shetreet and
Jules Deschênes (eds), Judicial independence: the contemporary debate (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985) 529.
12 Charles Gardner Geyh, ‘The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality’ (2013) 65 Florida Law Review 493, 494.
13 Judith Resnik, ‘On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges’ (1988) 61
Southern California Law Review 1877, 1882.
14 ibid 1876–1877. Resnik also points out the irony that in the male-dominated domain of judging Lady
Justice is the emblem of the paradigm impartial judge.
4
5
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Impartiality, in a literal and general sense, involves several overlapping considerations:
equality of treatment (‘treating all rivals or disputants equally’), 15 an absence of bias and
prejudice (‘not prejudiced towards or against any particular side or party; fair; unbiased’), 16
and not being involved or invested in the outcome of a decision (‘[s]omeone who is impartial
is not directly involved in a particular situation, and is therefore able to give a fair opinion or
decision about it’). 17
Judicial impartiality, then, is simply impartiality applied to the judicial function, with
connotations of judging equally, fairly, without bias or prejudice, and without being
personally involved or invested in the outcome of a case. However, there is more to it than
that. Judges perform their function in a complex and dynamic environment and serve
different audiences: parties to litigation, the court they sit on, and the wider public. They also
must exercise their functions within set rules of court procedure. They perform their function
in a specific institutional, political and cultural context. 18 These layers of the judicial role make
putting order on the nature and scope of judicial impartiality that bit more complex. Geyh
offers perhaps the clearest and most convincing theoretical framework for understanding the
multi-faceted nature of judicial impartiality. 19 He argues that judicial impartiality possesses
three dimensions: i) a procedural dimension, ii) an ethical dimension, and iii) a political
dimension. Each dimension concerns judicial impartiality as it applies to three different
audiences: the procedural dimension concerns judicial impartiality for parties to litigation, 20
the ethical dimension is for judges themselves, 21 and the political dimension concerns judicial
impartiality for the body politic and the wider public.22
Aside from thinking about judicial impartiality as possessing different dimensions for
different audiences, commentators have also considered two main types of values that
underpin judicial impartiality: intrinsic value and instrumental value. 23 Judicial impartiality has
intrinsic value in that a judge who adheres to the principle acknowledges the dignity of litigants
appearing before courts, and recognises that exercising judicial power may affect others
beyond the immediate parties to the litigation.24 Judicial impartiality also has instrumental value
because it promotes accuracy of fact-finding, and makes people adversely affected by a
Definition from Lexico (Oxford), <https://www.lexico.com/definition/impartial> Accessed 12 February
2022.
16 Definition from Collins English Dictionary
<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/impartial> Accessed 12 February 2022.
17 ibid.
18 Impartiality, notes Resnik, is a term that is ‘culturally dependent.’ Resnik (n 13) 1886.
19 Geyh (n 12).
20 Where there is judicial impartiality in a procedural sense, parties enjoy a fair hearing from a judge who
adheres to norms of procedural justice (the right to a fair trial, or due process in the United States). Rules of
litigation are adhered to. Judges recuse themselves from a case where appropriate. This is all for the benefit of
the parties to the litigation.
21 The ethical dimension refers to the ethics of judging in an impartial way. The main beneficiaries here are
the judges themselves. Taking an oath to be impartial and adhering to a standard of judicial impartiality serves
their interests: ‘impartiality is an end in itself for the good judge.’ Geyh (n 12) 523.
22 ibid 529. The political dimension of judicial impartiality refers to impartiality with the end goal of
enhancing or preserving a judiciary’s institutional legitimacy within the body politic and in the eyes of the
public; the beneficiary here is the public.
23 The paradigm of judicial audiences is also considered by scholars investigating what judicial accountability
means. See further, Dejo Olowu, ‘Quest for Universal Standards of Judicial Integrity: Some Reflections on
the Bangalore Principles’ (2013) 69 India Quarterly 179, 182.
24 Mark Aronson, Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government
Liability (6th ed, Thomson Reuters 2017) 644.
15
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judge’s decision more likely to accept it, reducing enforcement costs in the decision-making
process. 25
Judges and commentators alike contend that judicial impartiality is fundamental to the
public’s confidence in a judiciary: its legitimacy ‘rests on the perception of judicial
impartiality’. 26 Lord Denning observed that ‘[j]ustice must be rooted in confidence: and
confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: ‘The judge was
biased’.’ 27 These reflections suggest that judicial impartiality is as much about the public’s
perception of it as it is about its actual existence in measurable terms. At a fundamental level,
a judiciary’s institutional legitimacy depends on public confidence that it will perform its
function impartially; judiciaries will not be followed if they are not respected. 28 In this sense,
judicial impartiality has a performative quality to it: judges (both as individuals and as part of
a collective judiciary) ought to convey impartiality outwardly. This is an important facet of
impartiality to consider in light of the present-day context in which judges judge both in
Ireland and further afield: judges and their decision-making are more visible and under more
scrutiny by the public and the media than ever before.
Finally, it is worth considering how the leading international instrument codifying judicial
conduct, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, addresses judicial impartiality. While
the instrument sets out judicial impartiality as a stated principle, it does not define it, although
it emphasises that it ‘applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made.’ 29 In terms of the application of judicial impartiality, the Bangalore
Principles mirror some of the themes set out above in this section; for example, a judge shall
perform duties ‘without favour, bias or prejudice,’ and a judge shall ensure their conduct
‘maintains and enhances the confidence of the public.’30
The next section considers present and near-future challenges that the Irish judiciary faces
when considering judicial impartiality.

Challenges to the Irish Judiciary
Measuring Judicial Impartiality: Empirical Research on Extraneous,
Non-Legal Factors that Affect Judging
Judicial impartiality is not binary in the sense that a judge is absolutely impartial or not. There
is a wealth of empirical evidence from a variety of academic disciplines showing that judges
in different jurisdictions are susceptible to a range of extraneous, non-legal factors that can
affect their decision-making and judicial outcomes. From the mid-20th century onwards,
political scientists measured the political leanings of judges in their decision-making, starting
out by observing decision-making on the higher courts of the US judicial system, and
extending the enquiry to many other jurisdictions. 31 From around the 1970s onwards,
researchers began exploring correlations between judges’ personal and demographic
ibid 622.
Cassandra Burke Robertson, ‘Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era’ (2018) 70 Florida Law Review 739, 739.
27 Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577, 599.
28 McIntyre (n 4) 174–175.
29 Value 2, Impartiality.
30 For background and analysis to the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, see Olowu (n 23).
31 See further, Brian M Barry, How Judges Judge: Empirical Insights Into Judicial Decision-Making (Informa Law from
Routledge 2021) ch 4.5.4 Judges' politics and decision-making: a global perspective.
25
26
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characteristics and their decision-making–for instance, whether judges of different races,
ethnicities, genders, ages and religions decide specific types of cases differently. Related to
this, researchers have also enquired whether–all other things being equal–judges favour or
disfavour litigants with specific personal or demographic characteristics; so-called social
biases. Other researchers have investigated what motivates judges as self-interested
professionals: how pay, leisure, retirement, prestige and reputation can affect the judge as a
career-following professional, and the consequences of these factors for their decisionmaking. 32
The bulk of this empirical scholarship has taken an archival approach, sifting through the
records of decided cases. However, since the 1990s, researchers at the intersection of
psychology and judicial systems have employed experimental research modes to better
understand factors that affect judging. These researchers have tested how theories, concepts
and phenomena from psychology may affect judicial behaviour and decision-making by
conducting experimental studies based on mock trial vignettes to test practising judges’
decision-making in controlled environments. For instance, experiments have demonstrated
judges’ susceptibility to cognitive biases such as hindsight bias, confirmation bias and the
anchoring effect when deciding cases.33 Researchers have also drawn from other psychology
literature to test for the negative effects of motivated reasoning and emotion in judicial
decision-making and phenomena that affect group decision-making by judicial panels. This
experimental research paves the way for empirical triangulation, whereby experimental
results are compared against trends from archival data on actual cases to see if the
phenomenon still holds in real-world judging.
Scholarship on judicial behaviour and decision-making is increasingly broad in scope, ever
more sophisticated and sometimes revelatory. While the overall impression conveyed by the
findings of this research is not surprising–judges are human, and susceptible to error in the
same way everyone else is–the findings are important for properly understanding the true
meaning and nature of judicial impartiality. If judicial impartiality is a principle that judges
must ascribe to, it cannot realistically be equated with perfect impartiality because that is an
unattainable ideal. Canadian Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin referred to judicial impartiality
as an ‘impossible quest,’ 34 while Resnik observes how ‘tensions between stated expectations
and practice lend an air of unreality to the articulated demands for impartiality.’ 35 Although
impartiality is sometimes conceptualised as an absolute standard, it is a principle – that is, a
value-based proposition. Therefore, it may be better to think of judicial impartiality not as
an unattainable aspiration, but rather in terms of achieving an impartiality to an acceptable
degree or point on a spectrum. ‘Impartial enough’ has, Geyh notes, ‘of necessity, become the
realistic goal.’ 36
This line of research not only confirms that perfect impartiality is indeed an unrealistic and
unachievable ideal, but its findings speak to how impartial a judge is or is not in their role.
Measuring the degree to which specific, extraneous, non-legal factors can affect judges’
behaviour and decision-making allows us to grasp what is ‘impartial enough.’ Put another
ibid 3.
For an overview, see ibid 2.
34 Rt Hon Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, ‘Judicial Impartiality: The Impossible Quest?’ in Ruth Sheard
(ed), A Matter of Judgment: Judicial Decision-Making and Judgment Writing (Judicial Commission of New South
Wales 2003) 17.
35 Resnik (n 13) 1879.
36 Geyh (n 12) 493.
32
33
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way, this empirical scholarship helps to tease out what is acceptable and what is unacceptable
of judges on the bench.
Judges often correctly acknowledge their inevitable imperfections, allowing them to improve
their craft by addressing the factors that may be at play when they sit on the bench. To offer
one example, New South Wales Court of Appeal judge David Ipp noted that the duty of
judges is to ‘suppress their preconceptions and leanings of the mind [emphasis added].’ 37 Here,
Judge Ipp accepts judges unavoidably have these preconceptions and leanings of the mind
to begin with: the aim is to acknowledge and manage them rather than eradicate them
altogether. This evinces the idea that the aim of judiciaries (and, by extension, the Judicial
Council) should be to proactively tackle partiality, and to do so in a meaningful, tangible sense.
Put simply, impartiality must be worked on. Some suggestions in this regard are made in the
final section of this article.

Judicial Analytics
Legal realist and associate justice of the US Supreme Court Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked
in 1897 that ‘[f]or the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics.’ 38 In the last decade or so, new
legal technology tools have made Holmes’ vision a reality, helping lawyers and their clients
statistically analyse their chances of success or otherwise, allowing them to better predict case
outcomes before particular judges in particular courts against particular lawyers on the
opposite side. These tools have had a growing and transformative effect on litigation practice
in other jurisdictions in certain areas of law. 39
Driven by big data, machine learning and natural language processing, judicial analytics tools
such as Lex Machina, Premonition, Ravel Law and Solomonic (to name a few) assist lawyers
to make all-important calls for their clients on whether to settle or proceed to trial, and what
arguments to run if they do go to trial. These tools promise to relieve lawyers from having
to rely on intuition, experience or anecdotal evidence and rather, base their litigation strategy
on statistical insights into judicial behaviour derived from highly-sophisticated mining and
aggregation of past data from the courts.
This technology appears to be at the cusp of infiltrating the legal market in Ireland,40 with at
least one international law firm with a presence in Ireland using predictive tools to identify
trends and patterns in judicial decision-making. 41 Some judicial analytics start-up companies
David Ipp, ‘Judicial Impartiality and Judicial Neutrality: Is There a Difference?’ (2000) 19 Australian Bar
Review 212, 212.
38 ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 469.
39 For an overview, see Jena McGill and Amy Salyzyn, ‘Judging by Numbers: Judicial Analytics, the Justice
System and Its Stakeholders’ (2021) 44 Dalhousie Law Journal 249.
40 See Hannah Gallagher, ‘The Deployment of Big Data Analytics Technologies in Law Firms in Ireland and
the Potential Impact on the Future Delivery of Legal Services: Risks and Solutions’ (2020) 19 Hibernian Law
Journal 45, 53–54; Mary Hallissey, ‘Use Data Analytics to Swerve Poor Litigation Decisions, Lawyers Urged’
(Law Society Gazette, 6 October 2020) <https://www.lawsociety.ie/gazette/top-stories/use-data-analytics-toswerve-poor-litigation-decisions-lawyers-urged> accessed 11 January 2022; Rónán Kennedy, ‘Algorithms, Big
Data and Artificial Intelligence in the Irish Legal Services Market’ (Oireachtas Library & Research Service
2021) Library & Research Service Spotlight 2 14–15.
41 Pinsent Masons, ‘Pinsent Masons Partners with Solomonic to Develop IP Disputes Analytics Module’ (29
October 2019) <https://www.pinsentmasons.com/about-us/announcements/pinsent-masons-partnerswith-solomonic-to-develop-ip-disputes-analytics-module> accessed 11 January 2022.
37
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are developing their presence in Ireland. 42 One Irish solicitor predicts that once there are a
few products being used by Irish lawyers, then there will be a ‘cascade effect … [t]he bigger
firms, those with the resources, will do it first.’ 43 If experiences in other jurisdictions are
anything to go by, it seems inevitable that the Irish legal professions will not be oblivious to
market forces and Irish solicitors and barristers will probably employ these tools more and
more in the near future in a bid to be more categoric and certain in their advice to their
clients.
This has consequences for the Irish judiciary and for how judicial impartiality is perceived.
Trends in Irish judges’ propensities and predilections to decide certain types of cases in
certain ways will become readily available and scrutinised by Irish lawyers (and, perhaps,
interested members of the public and the media). As with any emerging technology,
imperfections and errors will inevitably occur. Some tools may prove unreliable, poorly
developed and unable to capture nuances in individual cases, particularly in their early
iterations. Some lawyers may use such tools improperly and crudely rely on the results they
generate all too readily.
Nevertheless, judicial analytics tools will become unavoidably attractive to litigators looking
to gain an advantage over their competitors in the Irish legal services market, and they will
improve and become more powerful as more and more data about the work of courts
becomes available. To offer just one example, with the shift to online hearings during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and audio-visual recordings of court proceedings, developers of
judicial analytics tools may extend the reach of their datasets beyond written judgments to
analysing trends during oral argument: for instance, automatically generated transcripts of
hearings could reveal patterns in the nature and frequency of individual judges’ questions
from the bench.
The Irish judiciary ought to be aware of how this nascent technology may affect how lawyers
engage with the Irish court system, who in the not-too-distant-future will likely be armed
with detailed information about individual judges’ past performance and information about
which judges are statistically more likely to be friendlier to their client’s case than other judges
are. Although it is entirely premature to suggest that litigation analytics will damage the Irish
judiciary’s reputation, experience elsewhere suggests that such tools have the potential to
affect perceptions of judicial impartiality.
In 2016, a French tax lawyer and AI-specialist published data on his website about French
immigration judges’ decision-making trends on applications for asylum. The data highlighted
wide discrepancies between individual judges on whether to grant asylum seekers asylum in
France. Some judges rejected asylum seekers’ claims nearly 100% of the time while others,
even colleagues on the same courts, had very low rejection rates. 44 This probative research,
a prototype judicial analytics tool of sorts, raised concerns of a lack of judicial impartiality on
For example, Premonition, an AI service that mines information to present litigators’ winning percentages
before specific judges, has an Irish director. See, also, courtdesk.com
43 David Cowan, ‘The Prediction Predilection’ (2019) 113 Law Society Gazette 48, 51. However, one
commentator notes that such tools may be of lesser value in Ireland than in other jurisdictions because judges
are assigned cases late into the litigation process during a morning call over. Gallagher (n 40) 49.
44 The data was published on a website, Supralegem.fr, which has since been closed down. Some of the data
from this analysis remains available online. Supra Legem, ‘The Impartiality of Some French Judges
Undermined by Machine Learning’ (19 December 2016) <https://medium.com/@supralegem/theimpartiality-of-some-judges-undermined-by-artificial-intelligence-c54cac85c4c4#.yfo64554t> accessed 12
January 2022.
42
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the French bench. 45 It also provoked criticism by some French judges, who challenged this
interpretation of the data and expressed concern that judicial independence had been
compromised by naming individual judges. 46 The official response was remarkably sweeping:
the French parliament passed Article 33 of the Justice Reform Act in 2019, effectively
banning judicial analytics tools in France altogether where they are designed to evaluate,
analyse, compare or predict the behaviour of individual judges, the first such ban in the
world. 47 The maximum sentence for this offence is five years in prison.48
The French law banning judicial analytics is troubling. While some rules on the use of AIdriven, prediction-based technologies within the legal profession may well be necessary, such
regulation must run with the irreversible tide of technology, rather than try to build a dam to
stop it entirely. In time, judicial analytics tools will likely become much less costly, making
information about trends of individual judges’ decision-making ubiquitous and accessible to
all.
How do these developments affect how we conceptualise the principle of judicial
impartiality? McGill and Salyzyn argue that at a broad, systemic level, ‘mainstreamed judicial
analytics tools may change the kind and quantity of critiques of judges and the justice system.
Both the impartiality and competence of judges are potential targets.’ 49 They further note
that should judicial analytics tools reveal trends of entirely superfluous extra-legal factors
affecting judicial decision-making, then ‘it will be difficult for a justice system committed to
judicial impartiality … to simply ignore this information.’ 50 Public perceptions may also be
affected if they have ready access to this type of information, however flawed or lacking in
nuance it may be.
Judicial analytics tools may also introduce a new dynamic in individual litigants’ bids to
disqualify individual judges from hearing a case for objective or apprehended bias. If a litigant
comes to court armed with statistical information generated by judicial analytics tools about
the presiding judge’s consistent propensity to disfavour a particular type of litigant in a
particular type of case, then arguably that information ought to be considered. Although
litigants alleging objective or apprehended bias face a heavy burden of proof, and
apprehended bias is a matter of perception, judicial analytics tools ‘have the potential to ease
the burden.’ 51
The Irish judiciary may well be forced to respond to these challenges in the near future.

ibid.
Michaël Benesty, ‘The Judge Statistical Data Ban - My Story - Michaël Benesty’ (Artificial Lawyer 7 June
2019) <https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2019/06/07/the-judge-statistical-data-ban-my-story-michaelbenesty/> Accessed 12 February 2022.
47 For analysis of this measure, see Malcolm Langford and Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘France Criminalises
Research on Judges’ (Verfassungsblog, 22 June 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/france-criminalises-researchon-judges/> accessed 12 January 2022.
48 Aside from the issue of litigation analytics, it is also important to note that the law also effectively prohibits
scholarship on the French judiciary altogether, insofar as individual judges and their decisions must not be
identified or analysed. This is a regressive, overbroad, and wholly disproportionate step, and a disservice to
the ideals of transparent, better-quality justice.
49 McGill and Salyzyn (n 39) 266.
50 ibid 268.
51 ibid 265.
45
46
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Media and Public Perception of Judicial Impartiality
Aside from the increase in empirical research and the proliferation of judicial analytics tools,
there is also increased scrutiny of judges through media coverage and social media
commentary. Lord Neuberger, while President of the UK Supreme Court, observed in 2015
that, alongside academic scrutiny, ‘our work is now being discussed far more by politicians,
journalists, and indeed members of the public.’ 52 He identified some catalysts for this
development: the increased ease of communication, judges being asked to determine more
public policy issues, and increasing powers of executive branches of government. 53 Two
years later, media criticism of courts became headline news in its own right when The Daily
Mail ran their now-infamous story about the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 54 with the headline and sub-headline: ‘Enemies
of the people: Fury over ‘out of touch’ judges who have ‘declared war on democracy’ by
defying 17.4m Brexit voters and who could trigger a constitutional crisis’55
Of course, this is just one high-profile example of media criticism of judges and their
decisions. Earlier examples include the then UK Home Secretary David Plunkett using a
newspaper column to opine that ‘it’s time for judges to learn their place.’ 56 Other columnists
have directed criticisms towards individual judges–for example, one columnist described
Lady Justice Hale as ‘the marriage wrecker,’ for her views on gay partnership, heterosexual
cohabitation and divorce. 57 Former US President Donald Trump’s presidency was
characterised by regular criticism of individual judges in the media. 58 Senator Ted Cruz wrote
an editorial describing the US Supreme Court’s decisions endorsing same-sex marriage and
upholding the Affordable Care Act as ‘brazen,’ ‘lawless’ and that the Court’s ‘hubris and
thirst for power have reached unprecedented levels.’59
Criticism of individual judges and courts and their decisions in this vein is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, it may be considered a healthy manifestation of a well-functioning
democracy, reflecting robust protection of freedom of expression for media outlets and the
public more broadly. On the other hand, criticism of this ilk raises concerns for judicial
independence and judges’ latitude to decide cases impartially, particularly if that criticism is
irrational, outrageous or unjustified in some way. UK Supreme Court judges, for instance,
expressed misgivings about the tenor of the ‘Enemies of the people’ headline and article.
Lord Neuberger commented, ‘some of what was said was undermining the rule of law … if
without good reason the media or anyone else undermines our judiciary that risks
undermining society.’60

Lord Neuberger, '"Judge Not, That Ye Be Not Judged’: Judging Judicial Decision-Making"’ (2015) 29 FA
Mann Lecture.
53 ibid.
54 [2017] UKSC 5.
55 Daily Mail, 4 November 2016.
56 David Plunkett, ‘It’s Time for Judges to Learn Their Place’ News of the World (23 February 2003).
57 Melanie Phillips, ‘The Marriage Wrecker’ Daily Mail (13 November 2003).
58 ‘In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts | Brennan Center for Justice’
<https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts>
accessed 6 January 2022.
59 Ted Cruz, ‘Constitutional Remedies to a Lawless Supreme Court’ [2015] National Review.
60 ‘BBC Radio 4 - Today’ (16 February 2017).
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The Irish judiciary is also the subject of more commentary and scrutiny than ever before by
the media and on social media,61 albeit media commentary and coverage to date is generally
expressed in more sober and less virulent terms than it is in other jurisdictions.62 There is
increased reportage and commentary of judicial proceedings and decisions, 63 and on
institutional issues such as ongoing reforms of judicial appointments and disciplinary
processes. 64 For instance, it is reasonable to suggest that the recent controversy and media
coverage surrounding Mr Justice Seamus Woulfe’s attendance at an Oireachtas Golf Society
dinner during the COVID-19 pandemic and the investigation that followed caused at least
some damage to the public’s perception of the judiciary’s ability to deal with matters of
alleged judicial misconduct.
The use of social media to live report on ongoing legal proceedings is also a recent
phenomenon, leading to new practice directions on the use of cameras and electronic devices
in courts, including limiting the use of live text-based communications during court
proceedings to bona fide members of the news media profession or professional legal
commentators. 65
Because the media, in all its guises–press, television, radio, online discourse and social media
platforms–is a filter for how the public receive information about the work of courts, the
nature and tenor of media coverage and social media commentary may, in and of itself, have
some influence over the public’s perceptions of judicial conduct and individual judges’
impartiality (or lack thereof). Research demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that members of the
public who perceive court proceedings to be largely legalistic tend to offer more positive
assessments of the courts. 66 Given judges, courts and their decisions are in the media and
social media spotlight more than ever before, this concomitantly increases the media and
social media’s power to influence public attitudes on the work of judges.

O’Donnell CJ recently commented on the proliferation of commentary about Irish judges on social media,
see further Shane Phelan, ‘Judges Have Become an ‘Easy Target’ for Social Media Flak, Says Incoming Chief
Justice’ Irish Independent (17 June 2021) <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/judges-havebecome-an-easy-target-for-social-media-flak-says-incomingchief-justice-40548434.html> Accessed 12
February 2022.
62 For a history on criticised, see Mary Kotsonouris, ‘Criticising Judges in Ireland’ (2001) 2 Judicial Studies
Institute Journal 79.
63 For example, the extensive media reporting of the murder trial of two boys for the murder of 14-year-old
Ana Kriégel in 2018 precipitated debate about how juvenile trials are contemporaneously reported by the
media. For analysis, see further, Peo Mosepele, ‘Should Ireland Prohibit the Contemporaneous Media
Reporting of Juvenile Trials?’ (2021) 1 Irish Judicial Studies Journal 71.
64 For analysis of judicial appointments processes, see, for example, Dermot Feenan, ‘Judicial Appointments
in Ireland in Comparative Perspective’ (2008) 1 Judicial Studies Institute Journal; Dermot Feenan, ‘Judicial
Appointments in Ireland: Some Comparative Perspectives’ in Eoin Carolan (ed), Judicial Power in Ireland
(Institute of Public Administration 2018); Laura Cahillane, Tom Hickey and David Kenny, ‘Submission to
Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice on Head of Judicial Appointments Commission Bill’ (2021). For
analysis of judicial disciplinary processes, see Laura Cahillane, ‘Ireland’s System for Disciplining and
Removing Judges’ (2015) 38 Dublin University Law Journal 55. Former Minister for Transport, Shane Ross,
also regularly publishes opinion pieces about the judiciary and individual judges in the Sunday Independent
and thejournal.ie.
65 See Practice Directions SC18, HC80, CA11, CC20, DC10 on the use of cameras and electronic devices in
court introduced in November 2018.
66 Vanessa A Baird and Amy Gangl, ‘Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of the Media’s Framing of
Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of Fairness’ (2006) 27 Political Psychology 597, 599.
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This challenges traditional conceptions that people are socialised to subscribe to the ‘myth’
that courts rely on legalism and objectivity.67 Casey observed that this myth relies on courts’
ability to stay out of the public eye: courts’ ‘invisibility and distance from the mass public
sustain myth and thus legitimacy,’ he noted. 68 That invisibility and distance has slowly but
steadily been eroded through the proliferation of media coverage and social media
commentary of courts, with consequences for the public’s perception of judicial legitimacy.
Specifically, the manner in which the media portrays courts and judges can influence the
public’s attitude towards judiciaries. One US study on the media’s influence over public
attitudes towards judges found that different types of media discussing the work of courts–
sensationalist (ie, political radio and cable news) or sober (ie, newspapers and network news)–
influenced individuals’ attitudes towards those courts in different ways. Individuals exposed
to sober media coverage on US courts were more positive in their evaluation of those courts
than those who were exposed to media coverage from ideological, partisan and sensationalist
sources. Of course, media coverage is a jurisdiction-specific issue, but nevertheless, there are
perhaps indications that a milder version of this dynamic may well emerge in Ireland in due
course.
Given that there is more media coverage and social media commentary of the work of courts,
and the tone of that coverage can affect public perception of judges and their ability to decide
cases impartially, then it is perhaps incumbent on judiciaries, including the Irish judiciary
through the Judicial Council, to be more publicly engaged than they traditionally have been
to date, to make the case to their public that they are doing all they can to do their job to the
best of their ability. Of course, a delicate balance must be struck: individual judges staying
out of the limelight is no bad thing, particularly when it comes to judge’s proper reticence to
discuss or comment on specific legal proceedings. However, there is perhaps a different
dynamic at an institutional level. Johnston and Bartels argue that ‘the more people know
about the courts, the more positive their impressions of court procedures and outputs
become,’69 and point to empirical evidence to support their claim. Citizens who receive more
good quality information about the work of courts may be more likely to view those courts
favourably. 70 Put simply, ‘[t]o know the Court is to love it.’ 71 Indeed, Frank Clarke’s tenure
as Chief Justice epitomised this, characterised by increasing public engagement and raising
the public profile of the Supreme Court—the most vivid example, perhaps, being the first
live broadcast of proceedings in the Supreme Court in 2017. 72 The Supreme Court also sat
in different cities during his tenure, and he also led the Court in conversations with
secondary-school pupils around the country. 73
The Judicial Council ought to carefully consider how they address the challenges posed by
more diverse, probative and critical media coverage and social media commentary of Irish
courts. The Council is, after all, tasked with promoting judicial impartiality and public
confidence in the judiciary. 74 Promotion, in this sense, is not necessarily merely confined to
Christopher D Johnston and Brandon L Bartels, ‘Sensationalism and Sobriety Differential Media Exposure
and Attitudes toward American Courts’ (2010) 74 Public Opinion Quarterly 260, 262.
68 Gregory Casey, ‘The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical Investigation’ (1973) 8 Law & Society
Review 385, 387.
69 Johnston and Bartels (n 67) 261.
70 ibid.
71 ibid 263.
72 Mary Carolan, ‘Supreme Court Live: Ireland Broadcasts Judgments for First Time’ The Irish Times (24
October 2017) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/supreme-court/supreme-courtlive-ireland-broadcasts-judgments-for-first-time-1.3266220> accessed 13 January 2022.
73 Irish Supreme Court, ‘Annual Report’ (2018) 72–80.
74 S7(1)(a) and (f) of the 2019 Act respectively.
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promoting these principles internally to the judges themselves, but also to promote them
externally to the public, by explaining how the Irish judiciary goes about its work, how judges
are trained and disciplined, and what specific initiatives are being taken to achieve excellence
and high standards of judicial conduct, including judicial impartiality.

The Judicial Council’s Role in Promoting and Maintaining
Judicial Impartiality
The first formative years since the establishment of the Judicial Council are, of course,
fundamentally important to how it will operate to fulfil its statutory functions into the future.
The Council’s work in its first two years has necessarily concentrated on forming the
committees required under the 2019 Act, 75 and on preparing and adopting guidelines,
procedures and mechanisms required by the Act within stipulated time periods.
The Council will soon enter a second phase once these statutory obligations are complete.
The Council and its committees will then have an opportunity to take stock, to engage in a
broader consideration of how it can best achieve its general functions set out in s 7(1) of the
2019 Act into the future. It is suggested that this should include giving consideration to the
nature and scope of judicial impartiality, and how best to support judges in upholding and
exemplifying it now and into the near-future. Indeed, the expressly sets out that the Council’s
function is to maintain high standards of judicial conduct. This requires the Council to attend
to the matter on an ongoing basis and should involve foreseeing what may undermine or
threaten high standards of judicial conduct in the future.
Of course, this specific function of the Council and the Judicial Conduct Committee should
not be viewed in isolation and rather, should be considered harmoniously alongside the other
functions set out in s 7(1) of the 2019 Act. In particular, the Council’s other functions to
‘promote and maintain … (a) excellence in the exercise by judges of their judicial functions
… d) continuing education of judges’ and ‘… (f) public confidence in the judiciary and the
administration of justice’ all closely link to promoting and maintaining high standards of
judicial conduct and to assist judges in upholding and exemplifying judicial impartiality.
To truly maintain high standards of judicial conduct in its second operational phase, the
Judicial Council ought to reflect on the specific, contemporary challenges the Irish judiciary
faces such as those identified here: a) empirical research on judicial behaviour and decisionmaking, b) the likely proliferation of judicial analytics tools in the Irish legal services market
and its consequences for how lawyers interact with, and perceive the Irish judiciary, and c)
more probative and critical media coverage and social media commentary of individual cases,
individual judges and the Irish judiciary as a collective. Each challenge presents obstacles,
sometimes overlapping, to how individual judges, and the judiciary as a collective, perform
and convey impartiality. A common thread running through each of these challenges is that
each can suggest or reveal, to varying degrees of accuracy, flaws in judges’ work that may
point to an actual lack of judicial impartiality or give rise to such a perception.
In order for judges to truly uphold judicial and exemplify impartiality, it is better for the
Council to help judges achieve the ‘realistic goal’ of being ‘impartial enough,’ as Geyh put it,
by identifying flaws in the judicial process and in their decision-making by giving judges
The committees are the Judicial Studies Committee, the Personal Injuries Guidelines Committee, the
Sentencing Guidelines and Information Committee, the Judicial Support Committee and the Judicial Conduct
Committee.
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whatever supports, education, technology tools and information that may be required to
mitigate those flaws. Such an approach is more likely to achieve better standards of judging
than reflexively acclaiming judicial impartiality as a counsel of perfection that judges must
adhere to. In their ongoing review of judicial impartiality, the Australian Law Reform
Commission suggests a process of reframing the expectations put on judges, focussed on
‘supporting impartiality’ as follows:
Rather than the ‘good judge’ being one who is peculiarly resistant to bias, steps a
judge takes to acknowledge and mitigate bias and the appearance of it should be seen
as positive contributions to upholding impartiality … judges should be supported by
systems and structures that prevent and mitigate, to the extent possible, challenges
to impartiality arising, and properly equip judges to manage them when they
inevitably do. 76
The Commission suggests a ‘degree of recalibration to reflect scientific understandings of
the extent to which judges, even with their training, experience, and commitment to
impartiality, can ‘resist bias’.’ 77 At the heart of this incisive analysis is an acceptance of judges’
imperfections and of the science that underpins our understanding of them, and how those
imperfections must be worked on.
The Judicial Council could engage in funding external expert research on aspects of judging
and judgecraft and court procedure that concern or affect judicial impartiality, and how it
can be realised more fully by the Irish judiciary in light of the current and future challenges
it faces. 78 Such research ought to be tailored to inform the experiences of Irish judges,
present and future, on how they can best perform and convey judicial impartiality in Irish
courts, based on extant empirical evidence. This research could lead to recommendations on
how to improve judges’ efforts to uphold and exemplify judicial impartiality. For instance,
judicial training and education programmes specifically address contemporary
understandings of the nature and scope of judicial impartiality and could integrate empirical
evidence on judges’ susceptibility in multiple jurisdictions and in different judging contexts
to a variety of errors, biases and prejudices that affect their behaviour and decision-making.
Encouragingly, some efforts appear to have been made recently in this regard. 79 In other
jurisdictions where judicial training is more advanced, experimental studies using mock trial
vignettes have facilitated judges’ meaningful self-reflection on their judging practice, helping
them to learn from each other in a systematic way, based on data about their own

Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Judicial Impartiality: Consultation Paper’ (2021) CP 1 6.
ibid.
78 The Australian Law Reform Commission’s report on judicial impartiality is an impressive, comprehensive
precedent in this regard. Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Review of Judicial Impartiality’
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiry/review-of-judicial-impartiality/> accessed 14 January 2021.
79 Mary Carolan, ‘New to the Bench: Judges to Be Trained for the First Time’ The Irish Times (17 September
2021) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-to-the-bench-judges-to-be-trained-for-thefirst-time-1.4676043> accessed 13 January 2022.
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performance in a controlled setting.80 This may help them to achieve better outcomes on the
bench. 81
Leading judges, at home and abroad, agree on the link between training and its potential to
improve judicial conduct. Former Chief Justice Frank Clarke observed that ‘with enhanced
training it may well be that there will be in the long run less complaints than might otherwise
be the case [of judicial misconduct]’ further noting that ‘not every case of bad conduct can
be put down to a lack of training but some can.’ 82 Lord Neuberger, speaking extra-judicially
in 2015, suggested that ‘the topic of subconscious bias, although in its infancy, should now
achieve a more prominent position. …the time has come to address that thorny issue as part
of judicial education.’
Aside from training and education, judges may simply need more resources, more
information, and more data about trends in their own performance on the bench in the cases
that they decide. Judicial analytics tools technologies could be harnessed by the judiciary
themselves. Rather than leave it exclusively to the lawyers to mine the data (however crudely),
judges may also benefit from the insights that such tools have to offer in terms of
understanding where discrepancies or inconsistencies in judging trends may arise. Indeed,
armed with such information, they may be able to better explain why seemingly insidious
trends occur and why they are entirely justified, as well as identifying certain trends in certain
areas of law that may indicate that some work may need to be done to improve their
approach. The opportunity that judicial analytics tools present to acquire this information,
however sensitive it may be, ought not to be ignored.
Judicial processes and court rules can also be considered as levers to help improve judicial
impartiality. To tackle cognitive errors, bifurcating court trials into different parts to combat
confirmation bias, tweaking deliberation techniques to mitigate hindsight bias, and changing
how numerical information is described and presented to reduce numerical errors in judging
have all been suggested as ways to reduce the harmful effects of cognitive bias, and to
improve judicial impartiality. 83 To tackle social biases, implicit bias testing and training,
exposure to stereotype-incongruent information (which involves exposing decision-makers
to positive examples of people to counter stereotypes), auditing judges’ decisions for trends
of bias, and subtle tweaks to court procedure have also all been suggested to remove harmful
consequences of social bias against particular litigant groups in judging. 84 Such interventions
could be considered by the Council but, of course, interventions of this nature ought to be
rigorously pre-tested before being implemented.
Most prominently, US researchers Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Andrew Wistrich have
incorporated controlled experimental studies into judicial training days and conferences to good effect. See,
for example, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski and Andrew J Wistrich, ‘Inside the Judicial Mind’ (2000)
Cornell Law Review 777. Katja Šugman Stubbs, Miha Hafner and Mojca Plesničar have also conducted
experimental studies at judicial training events on members of the Slovenian judiciary. Katja Šugman Stubbs,
Miha Hafner and Mojca Plesničar, ‘The Impact of the Defendant’s Gender and Socio-Economic Status on
Criminal Law Decisions: An Experiment With Professional Judges’, Deconstructing the Objectivity of Judicial
Decisions (2021). The author also delivered a presentation to the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (Health and
Education Chamber) in March 2022 incorporating vignettes to tease out issues regarding judges’ susceptibility
to cognitive biases.
81 Of course, this is a matter of continuing judicial education and falls to be considered by the Judicial Studies
Committee, perhaps in tandem with the Judicial Conduct Committee.
82 Frank Clarke, ‘Keynote Address: Judicial Conduct in Ireland: A Framework Fit for Purpose?’ (2021).
83 For an overview, see Barry (n 31) 28–32 and 54–59.
84 For an overview, see ibid 183–185.
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Finally, judges and commentators have rightly recognised that judicial impartiality is
fundamental to the public’s confidence in a judiciary, and to its legitimacy. Geyh’s framework
for understanding impartiality identifies a political dimension to judicial impartiality: the
wider public is a crucial audience to whom judicial impartiality must be conveyed. 85 More
probative and critical media coverage and social media commentary present unique
challenges to judiciaries trying to perform impartiality from the bench. Recall that the
Council’s function is to promote high standards of judicial conduct and individual judges are
required to exemplify judicial impartiality. Both of these convey the sense that a crucial part of
judicial impartiality is to ensure that the public perceive and believe it.
To this end, public engagement ought to be high on the Council’s agenda to clearly
communicate the measures the Judicial Council and the Irish judiciary are taking to uphold
and exemplify judicial impartiality. Despite recent controversy surrounding judicial conduct,
the reality is that the Judicial Council, once all of its mechanisms and processes are fully
operational, will very soon have a good story to tell. Indeed, on one level, the so-called
‘Golfgate’ episode undoubtedly served to highlight the urgent need for a properly and fullyfunctioning disciplinary process that the Judicial Council is currently working towards.
If research demonstrates that ‘[t]o know the Court is to love it’ then it is incumbent on the
Council to explain what it does, how it works, and how the judicial system improves as a
result of its efforts. This is likely to persuade more members of the public than not, however
sceptical they may be, that the Irish judiciary is striving to be better and to improve how it
conducts itself, and that it is more accountable to the public than it has been in years past.
Arguably, in its first, formative years, the Council perhaps has been less publicly-engaged
than it could have been. To give one example, last year Irish judges participated in
unconscious bias training employing role-playing exercises with the help of actors, apparently
for the first time. This significant development, one that demonstrates the Irish judiciary’s
efforts to improve judicial impartiality, only emerged in public discourse through a story in
the press by a leading legal journalist. 86 The Judicial Council could concentrate on developing
its public profile through increased engagement with the media, more frequent coverage of
its activities on its website, by developing social media channels and preparing multimedia
content, to ensure that the public is informed about developments in the Irish judiciary. If
‘[t]o know the Court is to love it’, it may even be time for the Judicial Council to start a
conversation about whether we ought to follow the lead of the UK Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court to offer live streams and YouTube recordings of oral argument.
At the narrower level of individual judges and how they conduct themselves in court,
conveying impartiality can be quite subtle. For instance, a judge’s demeanour and writing
style can convey impartiality. 87 On the latter, Mr Justice Max Barrett’s initiative to write
litigant-friendly explainers of complex judgments is one laudable example of how judges can
demystify the judicial process, helping to engender a sense that litigants have been treated
fairly and impartiality, even if the result does not go their way.88 Further roll-out of this, and
Geyh (n 12).
Carolan (n 79).
87 For a fascinating exploration of how Australian judges ‘perform’ judicial impartiality through observational
measures of their demeanour on the bench, see Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Performing
Impartiality: Judicial Demeanor and Legitimacy’ (2010) 35 Law & Social Inquiry 137.
88 Ms Justice Nuala Butler observes that judgments ought to be written with the loser, as much as the winner
in mind:
The loser … will care very much. Therefore, it is important that on reading the judgment the loser is
made aware, first, that the Judge has heard and understood their argument and, second, why the Judge
85
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other similar measures throughout the Irish judicial system could be encouraged by the
Council to impart both the instrumental value of judicial impartiality (it acknowledges the
dignity of litigants appearing before the judge) and the instrumental value of judicial
impartiality (it helps people adversely affected by a judge’s decision more likely to accept it). 89
All of the above are untested suggestions that may help to respond to some of the current
challenges to judicial impartiality that the Irish judiciary currently face, or will face in the near
future. Once the Judicial Council’s formational work is done, it should reflect on how it can
proactively seek out and adopt creative ways to promote and maintain high standards of
judicial conduct, including the principle of judicial impartiality, so that it retains its vitality
and currency. To emphasise, impartiality is now more tangible and measurable than before,
and it ought to be worked on, honed and refined. Impartiality is not just an internal matter
for individual judges, particularly in light of the heightened scrutiny that judges now face.
The Council is well placed to communicate how Irish judges strive to uphold and exemplify
judicial impartiality. Taking the initiative will undoubtedly help to better ‘future-proof’ the
judiciary against threats to judicial impartiality, serving to further preserve the deservedlyhigh reputation that the Irish judiciary enjoys.

did not agree with that argument. The judgment should be not only a statement of why the winner
has won but mainly a statement of why the loser has lost. It is easier for a party to accept defeat if
they understand the rationale behind the outcome.
Nuala Butler, ‘Where Do I Begin? (Thoughts from a New Judge on Judgment Writing)’ (2021) 2 Irish Judicial
Studies Journal 47, 51.
89 Aronson, Groves and Weeks (n 24) 644.
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